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Abstract 
 
The objective study of self-recognition, with a mirror and a mark applied to the face, was 
conducted independently by Gallup (1970) for use with chimpanzees and monkeys, and by 
Amsterdam (1972) for use with infant humans.  Comparative psychologists have followed the 
model (and assumptions) set by Gallup whereas developmental psychologists have followed a 
different model (e.g., Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979).  This paper explores the assumptions in the 
definitions and methods of self-recognition assessments, in the 30 years since these initial 
studies, and charts the divergence between the developmental mark test and the comparative 
mark test.  Two new studies, one with infant chimpanzees and one with infant humans, illustrate 
a reconciliation of the two approaches.  Overt application of the mark, or other procedures 
related to how the mark is discovered, did not enhance mirror self-recognition.  In contrast, 
maternal scaffolding appears to enhance performance, perhaps by eliciting well-rehearsed verbal 
responses (i.e., naming self).  When comparable testing procedures and assessment criteria are 
used, chimpanzee and human infants perform comparably.  A combined developmental 
comparative approach allows us to suggest that mirror self-recognition may be based upon a 
specific aspect of mental representation, the cognitive ability to symbolize. 
 
Running head: Self-recognition in human and chimpanzee infants  
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Self-awareness in human and chimpanzee infants: 
What is measured and what is meant by the mark-and-mirror test? 
The procedure using a mirror and a mark on the face to assess self-recognition was 
developed more than 30 years ago.  Interestingly, Gallup (1970), a comparative psychologist, 
and Amsterdam (1972), a clinical child psychologist, independently arrived at the same paradigm 
to assess self-awareness in nonhuman primates and children, respectively.   We consider how 
these initial studies used the mark and mirror test (hence ‘the mark test’), and compare their 
assumptions. In the intervening years, the comparative and developmental traditions have 
diverged in meaningful ways in their use and interpretation of the mark test, which we highlight 
with a selective review.  We present two new studies, one with chimpanzee infants and one with 
human infants, with which we illustrate how the developmental and comparative paradigms 
might be reconciled.  This reconciliation is especially important for us because we are interested 
in comparing the emergence of mirror self-recognition in chimpanzee infants and human infants.  
As a consequence of our in-depth considerations of methodology, we end with reconsideration of 
the meaning of self-recognition as measured by the mark test. 
Developmental and comparative studies have typically used the mark test to ask different 
types of research questions.  Simply stated, developmental studies have been concerned with 
individual differences and developmental milestones, such as the age at which infants pass the 
test, whereas comparative studies have asked whether chimpanzees (or rhesus macaques, etc), as 
a species, possess a self-concept.  It is not surprising, therefore, that what we know about self-
recognition in humans and in nonhuman primates differs, for reviews see (Anderson & Gallup, 
1999; Courage, Edison, & Howe, 2004; Inoue Nakamura, 2001; Lewis, 1991).  Developmental 
and comparative studies often state that ‘the’ mark test was used, but the mark test as used by 
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developmentalists is quite distinct from that used by comparative psychologists. Here we 
consider many methodological issues of the mark test, directly comparing the two paradigms, 
with the view to better understand their differing assumptions about mirror self-recognition.  We 
begin at the point of origin, the initial developmental study by Amsterdam (1972) and the initial 
comparative study by Gallup (1970).  To highlight the disparity, we concentrate on two recent 
developmental studies (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993; Harel, Eshel, Ganor, & Scher, 2002) 
and two recent comparative studies (de Veer, Gallup, Theall, van den Bos, & Povinelli, 2003; 
Povinelli, Rulf, Landau, & Bierschwale, 1993).  Additional sources are used to support general 
points, but this is not a comprehensive literature review. 
The Gold Standard is the mark-and-mirror test 
Both paradigms agree that the mark test is an objective assessment, appropriate for 
nonverbal or preverbal organisms, because of the objective target behavior, defined as reference 
to the mark on the face after the mark is discovered by looking in the mirror (mirror self-
recognition: hence MSR).  Discussions of inductive and deductive reasoning surrounding mirror 
self-recognition can be found elsewhere (Mitchell, 1993a).  In this section we consider 
methodological details of how the mark is applied, the testing procedures, and the assessment 
criteria to ascertain the degree to which ‘the mark test’ is the same test across disciplines. 
 The mark and its application: Controlling how the mark is discovered.  The rationale, 
characteristics of the mark, and its application from the Amsterdam and Gallup studies are 
summarized in Table 1.  The material and placement of the mark differs; around or on the nose 
for children (Amsterdam, 1972; Asendorpf, 2002; Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984; Lewis & 
Brooks-Gunn, 1979), but on the forehead and ear for chimpanzees (Gallup, 1970; Lin et al., 
1992; Povinelli, et al., 1993).  However, in both studies the mark is applied unobtrusively.  For 
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human infants, the mark is applied as the mother pretends to wipe the infant’s nose (Asendorpf 
& Baudonniere, 1993; Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979).  In Gallup’s 
study, the mark was applied to the chimpanzees when they were anesthetized.  The rationale for 
the unobtrusive application of the mark is to keep the subject unaware that a mark had been 
applied. Thus, the mark is discovered only when the subject looks in the mirror.   
 It is interesting to note that few researchers in either developmental or comparative 
traditions have questioned whether the discovery process is really important.  Control of the 
discovery process has been considered so vital in comparative studies that extraordinary 
measures are taken (e.g., rendering individuals unconscious prior to application of the mark).   If 
the discovery process is crucial, then the developmental tradition may not be doing enough to 
keep the child unaware of the mark.  If it is not crucial, then the comparative tradition has 
established unnecessary controls. This issue is explored further in our illustrative studies.   
 Testing Procedures. There are two main similarities in the procedures of Gallup and 
Amsterdam; (a) the rationale to maximize motivation; and (b) that ‘natural behavior’ emerged.  
Comparative and developmental traditions differ in the procedures used to increase motivation 
and in the definitions of natural behavior.   
 Amsterdam maximized motivation by including maternal interventions (see Table 2).  
Mothers scaffold the infants’ response in two ways; first, when the mother asks  “Who’s that?” 
up to 3 times, eliciting a well-practiced response; and secondly by looking at the infant and at the 
mirror image, and pointing to direct the infant’s attention to the mirror image, she assisted in 
establishing the reference.  It is rare to find a developmental study that observes infant’s 
spontaneous response, without maternal interventions (Amsterdam, 1972; Bertenthal & Fischer, 
1978; Harel et al., 2002; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Schulman & Kaplowitz, 1977).  
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 Gallup maximized motivation by isolating the chimpanzees, giving them only the mirror 
with which to interact, and testing in unfamiliar settings.  Chimpanzees are initially mirror naïve 
(i.e., inexperienced with reflective surfaces), so that their entire learning history would be 
known.  Isolation during testing continues to be advocated because it controls for how the mark 
is discovered, i.e., isolation prevents others ‘informing’ about the mark (Povinelli et al., 1993).   
  The aim of Gallup and Amsterdam was to observe ‘natural’ behavior. In developmental 
studies, natural meant like everyday behavior, so the laboratory was designed to be similar to 
home, and procedures similar to those that occur at home.  In comparative studies, natural meant 
species-typical, untrained, and free from the influence of humans, and so the laboratory was 
designed to minimize potentially influential stimuli (albeit neglecting the artificiality of the 
isolation cage).  The traditions used different testing procedures, not due to species differences, 
but based on differing assumptions of natural behavior and therefore, how best to elicit it. 
Objective assessment of self-awareness: What are the criteria for the target behaviors?   
 The initial studies, and most subsequent studies, state that the purpose of the mark is to 
give a referent that can be located (only) with the use of the mirror (Amsterdam, 1972; 
Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993; Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984; Gallup, 1970; Harel et al., 2002; 
Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Povinelli et al., 1993).  In most studies, it is stated unequivocally 
that mark directed behavior is required to conclude self-recognition.  Yet even in the initial 
studies, mark directed behavior was not defined simply or similarly: in subsequent studies the 
operational definitions have varied considerably (see Table 3).  In Amsterdam’s study, self-
recognition was concluded to be present in 53% of the 18-24 month-old infants, but only 32% 
infants touched the dot.  It is interesting that touching the mark is assumed to be equivalent to 
touching the nose (because the mark is placed alongside the nose), and also equivalent to looking 
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at the mark in the mirror (even though this behavior does not conclusively indicate referencing 
the self).  Additionally self-labeling verbalizations (e.g., child’s name) are stated to be equivalent 
to referential verbalizations (e.g., ‘nose’), and both are assumed to be equivalent to touching the 
mark, e.g., ”touching the nose, wiping the nose repeatedly, and saying ‘nose’ or ‘red’” (p. 33), 
are all labeled as ‘mark touching’ by Lewis & Brooks-Gunn (1979).  In many developmental 
studies, touching the mark, per se, is not listed in the definitions (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 
1993; Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Chapman, 1987; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979).  Moreover, 
touching in ‘the region of the mark’ has become defined to include touching unmarked places on 
the face (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993).   Many types of behavior all labeled with a single 
heading of ‘mark-touching’, create at least two problems: touches to the mark, per se, cannot be 
determined; and truly referential behaviors cannot be distinguished.  The percent of human 
infants that pass the mark test is inconsistent (see Table 5), probably due to different operational 
definitions. 
Gallup (1970) concluded that self-recognition was present in chimpanzees when there 
was a convergence of behavioral changes in social behavior, self-directed behavior, and time 
looking at the mirror image (see Table 3). The mark test was used to confirm this conclusion, 
specifically, finding 25 touches to the mark in the presence of the mirror compared with a single 
mark-touch in its absence (Gallup, 1970).  In subsequent comparative studies, mark-touches are 
operationally defined to be referential touches, i.e., each touch must be mirror-guided (Hyatt & 
Hopkins, 1994; Inoue, 1994; Lin, Bard, & Anderson, 1992; Miles, 1994; Patterson & Cohn, 
1994; Suarez & Gallup, 1981; Swartz & Evans, 1991).   In comparative studies, mirror-guided 
self-explorations are important indices of self-recognition, but are insufficient evidence of MSR.   
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In developmental studies, a single instance of ‘reference’ is sufficient for the infant to 
be classified as a self-recognizer.  Moreover, reference is broadly defined: once the infant looks 
in the mirror then s/he is thought to have discovered the mark and all subsequent touches are 
‘counted’ as referential, regardless of lapsed time (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993; Lewis, 
Brooks-Gunn, & Jaskir, 1985).  In comparative studies, ‘reference’ is operationally defined in 
two ways: mirror-guided mark touches, defined as the co-occurrence of mark-touching and 
looking at mirror image; and reference is incorporated into the experimental design by testing 
initially when the mirror is absent, and then in the second phase, the mirror is presented.  
Touches to the marked areas of the face are tallied, those made when the mirror is present are 
compared empirically to those made when the mirror is absent (de Veer et al., 2003; Gallup, 
1970; Patterson & Cohn, 1994; Povinelli et al., 1993; Suarez & Gallup, 1981; Swartz & Evans, 
1991). Sometimes both referential criteria are required: each mark touch must be mirror-guided, 
but passes are determined by showing more mirror-guided mark-touches than touches to the 
mark without using the mirror (e.g., Povinelli et al., and see critique of Lin et al., 1992 study by 
Swartz, 1998). 
 Summary: Which mark test is the gold standard?  The developmental and the 
comparative procedures differ rather dramatically, resulting in ‘mark tests’ that are similar in 
name only. These differences occur in many aspects of the mark test, ranging from the materials 
used for the mark, the conditions in which the mark is applied, to the definitions of mark 
touching.    Touching the mark is a necessary requirement in comparative studies but in 
developmental studies, it is not.  MSR is concluded for human infants based on a variety of 
verbal and nonverbal behaviors (see Table 4), but for chimpanzees touching the mark is often the 
minimal requirement (de Veer et al., 2003; Povinelli et al., 1993).  A single touch is sufficient for 
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classifying human infants as self-recognizers, but many touches are required for chimpanzees 
to be similarly classified.  In the developmental tradition, reference is assumed if the infant has 
previously observed the mark in the mirror, whereas in the comparative tradition, reference is 
required for each touch (Swartz, Sarauw, & Evans, 1999).  The mark tests are disparate across 
traditions.  Therefore, comparing results from developmental mark tests with results from 
comparative mark tests is very problematic.  We wish to compare the development of MSR 
across species, and so require comparability in procedures and in assessment.  In the next 
section, we present two studies of mirror self-recognition, in part, to illustrate how new mark test 
procedures might be designed. 
Illustrative studies 
 Differences in the mark test as used in developmental and comparative studies have been 
attributed to differences in research question.  As a result of the last 30 years of research, we 
know that adult humans and adult chimpanzees possess mirror self-recognition, and we can now 
ask questions about how MSR develops in infancy across species.   The two new illustrative 
studies, presented here, use the mark test to ask the same developmental question about MSR in 
infants of two species.    In both studies, we assessed mirror self-recognition in individuals while 
they remained in a social group, we applied the mark while infants were awake, and we marked 
on the forehead so that we could more easily determine how well the infants touch the mark.  We 
observed spontaneous mirror-directed behavior in both groups (by inserting a 15-min 
observation with the human groups prior to the usual maternal prompts).  Additionally, in both 
studies, we broke conventions about covert marking: in the comparative study, we did not render 
the infants unconscious prior to applying the mark; in the developmental study, we told the 
infants that the mark was to be applied. We present the results of each study within its own 
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tradition, followed by two integrative analyses in which typical developmental analyses and 
then typical comparative analyses are applied to both sets of data.  These integrative analyses are 
important as we can directly compare the conclusions reached by each perspective about the 
same data.  As a result of the detailed consideration given to methodological differences, 
combined with these studies as concrete examples, we hope to convince developmental and 
comparative researchers that more similar procedures can be used in studies of mirror self-
recognition. 
Study One: Chimpanzee Infants 
The infant chimpanzee is neither an adult (chimpanzee) nor a human (infant), and so we 
had to decide about which developmental and which comparative testing procedures we would 
use with infant chimpanzees (Lin et al., 1992 and this follow-up).  We adapted most procedures 
from the developmental tradition, specifically by interpreting ‘natural’ to mean like the everyday 
life of these nursery-reared chimpanzees.  We thought that it was especially important to focus 
on minimizing distress, so we tested in a comfortable and familiar social setting and we marked 
with cosmetics, which were applied without anesthesia.  Although caregivers were present to 
alleviate distress, we chose not to use any caregiver scaffolding.  
The initial study suggested chimpanzees develop self-recognition between 24 and 30 
months but none were tested between 25 and 29 months (Lin et al., 1992).  Our goal was to 
replicate the previous study, with more subjects between 24 to 32 months of age, to ascertain the 
earliest age at which nursery-reared chimpanzees pass the mark test.  
Methods 
Participants.  Nine chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), of the following ages, were tested once 
or twice: 24 months (n=2), 28 months (n=5), 30 months (n=5), and 32 months (n=2).  All were 
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raised in the Great Ape Nursery of the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center of Emory 
University, given experience with mirrors (e.g., there were mirrored sections of wall in their 
rooms), and raised with 4 to 6 peers (Bard & Gardner, 1996).   
 Procedure.  Tests were conducted in a familiar indoor or outdoor room.  A mirror was 
placed .3m from the fence and a video camera positioned at an angle beside it.  All sessions were 
conducted with subjects remaining in their peer groups, because separation from the group can 
result in very distressed behavior, counter-productive to any assessment of cognitive ability.   
 All chimpanzee subjects received three mirror sessions, each lasting about 30 minutes; a 
"pretest" for a baseline of general mirror responses, and two mark sessions to maximize the 
likelihood that mark-directed behavior could be displayed.  Subjects were marked covertly on the 
forehead (above the eyebrow) with a white odorless cosmetic.  Familiar researchers groomed the 
chimpanzee’s face, and unobtrusively applied the mark.   
 Coding behavior.  Mutually exclusive and exhaustive codes were constructed to 
categorize behavior from videotaped observations, as in Lin et al. (1992). Mirror-guided, self-
directed behaviors were defined as “use of the mirror image to direct some action toward the 
chimpanzee’s own body” (p.122).  Mirror-guided, mark-directed behavior was defined as “use of 
the mirror image to direct some action toward the marked spot” (p. 122).  For a behavior to be 
coded as mirror-guided, it was required that the chimpanzee be looking into the mirror and for 
the actions to be influenced by the visual feedback.  Both behaviors required contact with a body 
part (for self-directed) or with the mark (for mark-directed).  Inter-observer reliability was 
assessed across 4 sessions; with 88% to 95% agreement; Cohen's Kappa of .73 to .85 (Bakeman 
& Gottman, 1997).   
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Results 
 Many of the specific findings replicated those found in Lin et al., (1992).  Social 
behaviors were directed at the mirror image in the older age groups, with the frequency 
decreasing across sessions (Figure 1).   Mirror-guided self-directed responses to the body and 
face were evident in all age groups (Figure 2).  Mirror-guided mark-directed responses were not 
found at 24 mos, but were found at all the other age groups. The frequency of touches to the 
mark with and without the use of the mirror is shown in Figure 3.  Table 6 summarizes the 
conclusions made with regard to whether each chimpanzee passed the mark-and-mirror test (see 
developmental analysis). 
Discussion of Study One 
 Previous research using this paradigm indicated that self-recognition was found in 5-year 
olds, in 4-year-olds, and in 2½-year olds, but not in 2-year-old chimpanzees (Lin et al., 1992).  
Here we found mark-directed behavior in chimpanzees 28 months and older, replicating the 
previous findings using the same testing procedures.  Mirror-guided self-directed behavior was 
found in all chimpanzees, which might be argued to indicate mirror self-recognition occurs in 
individuals as young as 24 months.  At 24months, however, we did not see the expected pattern 
of decreasing social responses to the mirror image over sessions, although we did see an increase 
in self-directed responses over sessions, albeit all behavior was at a low level in the final session.    
Based on the reasoning used by Gallup (1970), of behavioral convergence confirmed by mark 
directed behaviors, we conclude that chimpanzees "passed" the mark test typically between the 
ages of 28 and 30 months, slightly later than human infants (see Table 5).  But if we use the 
comparative requirement of more mark touches using the mirror than not, we would conclude 
that chimpanzees, from 24 to 32 months, do not have MSR (as in Swartz, 1998). 
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 The procedures used here, and in Lin et al (1992), clearly differ from traditional 
comparative studies.  Chimpanzee infants remained in a social group instead of being isolated.  
Is MSR enhanced if others point, touch, or refer to the mark?  We used cosmetics, applied while 
the infant chimpanzees were awake, instead of dye applied under anesthesia.  What is the effect 
of marking with make-up while the individual is awake and potentially ‘aware’?  The 
comparative paradigms controls how the mark is discovered; we used more lax procedures.  In 
the next study we explore the consequences of breaking some of the developmental conventions.  
Study Two: Humans Tested In Groups With Explicit Marking 
This study was designed with two goals: to explore the consequences of breaking 
conventions related to discovery; and to use procedures that would allow for direct comparisons 
with the previous study.  We maximized the likelihood that each human infant would know that 
s/he was marked, by fully informing them about the application of the make-up, and testing them 
in a social group so that others could inform, to see how this would affect MSR performance.  
Two groups of human infants were selected: 15-month-olds, who were considered too young to 
pass the MSR test; and 24-month-olds, who were all expected to pass (see Table 6).   Enhancing 
effects might be  a) younger infants displaying MSR; (b) more infants than expected displaying 
MSR; or (c) actual increases in the frequency of MSR behaviors.  Alternatively, if the discovery 
process did not influence self-recognition, then the pass rates of individuals within each age 
group, and the frequency of MSR behavior will be as expected based on the literature.  To assess 
the effect of maternal interventions, we added a 10 –15 min baseline period before maternal 
prompting. 
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Methods 
 Participants.  Nine human infants, 24 months (n=4) and 15 months (n=5) were subjects.  
All were raised in the south of England in intact families, with extensive experience with 
mirrors.  The infants were tested with familiar same-aged peers (played together for at least 6 
months). 
 Procedure. Each group was tested once, in a session lasting approximately 30 minutes, 
with the same set-up and procedure.   A mirror was placed in the corner of a large room, with a 
videocamera directed at an angle beside it.  A chair was placed next to the mirror, for the mother 
of the focal individual.  An additional camera was positioned to view the room.  Chairs were 
placed along the wall, away from the mirror, for the other mothers.   
 Mirror self-recognition testing of spontaneous behavior.  Mothers and their infants were 
invited to the Infant Study Unit, University of Sussex, for a group session.  They were given 5 
minutes of free play to habituate to the laboratory.  A mother was asked to bring her infant to the 
mirror and say “ Can I put some make-up on you?”.  (No infant declined). The mother placed a 
dot of red lipstick in the middle of the child’s forehead, slightly above the eyebrows.  The mother 
continued to sit next to the mirror for up to 2 minutes (depending on infants’ interest in the 
mirror), and then returned to sit next to the other mothers.  This same procedure was followed by 
each mother until all the infants were marked, which took 15 to 20 minutes. 
   Mirror self-recognition testing of prompted behavior Approximately 5 minutes after all 
the infants were marked, the first mother brought her infant back to the mirror.  The mother 
pointed to the child’s image in the mirror, and asked “ Who’s that?”.   After a short pause, the 
mother handed a wipe to the infant and said “Can you clean up the make-up?”, without 
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mentioning the child’s face.  Verbal prompts were given up to 3 times if the infant did not 
respond.    
 Assessment of false negatives.   The experimenter handed the mother a doll and the 
lipstick, and the mother applied a dot to the doll’s forehead.  While holding the marked doll, the 
mother asked the infant again “Can you clean up the make-up?” again without mentioning the 
child’s face, or the doll.  If the infant did not respond after 3 repetitions and an additional 30 sec, 
the mother removed the mark from the doll with another wipe.  The mother waited another 30 
sec to see if, after watching the mother wipe the doll, the infant would remove his/ her own 
mark. If not, then the mother removed the infant’s make-up, and returned to her seat.  All the 
mother-infant pairs engaged in both the prompted trials and false negative tasks.   
Coding Behavior.  From the close-up videotaped observations, touch self head (HEAD), 
touch self face (FACE), and touch self mark (MARK) were recorded.  An additional category 
was added after viewing a session: touch close to the mark (CLOSE), defined as within a 2 cm 
diameter of the mark without actually touching the mark.  Whether the actions were guided by 
the mirror image was recorded.  Points at self (in the mirror), points at other children (with or 
without the mirror), touching other’s mark, and verbal labels were recorded as they occurred.   
 The infants’ responses were noted: (a) to the mothers’ query of “Who’s that?” (best 
response - ‘me’ or own name); (b) to the mothers’ request to clean up make-up with wipe (best 
response -touch the mark while looking in the mirror); and (c) the mothers’ request to clean up 
make-up when doll was marked (best response- wipe mark on self; second best response -wipe 
the mark on the doll).  Reliability was assessed on 2 sessions (one 15-month and one 24-month 
session), and observed agreement was 100% for MARK and CLOSE. 
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Results 
 None of the 15-month-old children passed the test, and 4 of 5 infants demonstrated that 
they understood the task, i.e. they wiped the mark off the doll (Table 7).  One 15-month-old did 
not do this, and so lack of understanding might account for the failure.  The other four 15-month-
olds understood the task but did not exhibit any mirror-guided mark-directed behavior.  All the 
24-months understood the task and exhibited self-recognition (self-label).  Although all the 24-
months engaged in mirror-guided self-directed behavior, only two used the mirror to touch the 
mark.   
 We recorded spontaneous behaviors to compare with prompted behaviors (Table 8).  The 
most dramatic effect was in self-labeling: None of the infants gave a self-label prior to maternal 
prompting, but after mothers asked ‘who’s that?’, all 24-months did. Maternal prompting did not 
have as dramatic an effect on other behaviors. In the older group, one infant touched the mark 
spontaneously and one after prompting (but after prompting two additional infants touched the 
mark without using the mirror).  One 15-month-old touched close to the mark, and touched her 
head after the maternal prompt, but did none of these spontaneously.     
Discussion Of Study Two  
The results of this study are similar to those from many published studies, specifically 
that 15-month-olds do not pass the mark test but by 24 months all pass.  Failure to pass was not 
due to failure to understand the task.  The infants were explicitly and overtly marked, and tested 
while in a group. It is clear that these procedures did not inflate mark-directed behavior in human 
infants.  Moreover, these procedures did not cause ‘false positives’: no infant touched the mark 
in response to its application, or in response to comments from peers, without also engaging in 
mirror-guided mark-touching.  In fact, under group testing conditions, it seems that the infants 
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were more interested in playing (both with other infants and with toys) than the mirror.  
Therefore, infants in this study appeared to exhibit less mirror engagement than in typical MSR 
studies when only mother and infant are present.  How the mark is discovered may be 
unimportant in the mark test. 
In this study we measured mark touching distinct from other referential behaviors, and 
spontaneous behavior distinct from maternally prompted behavior. We found that MSR 
classification differed as a function of  ‘mark-touching’ definitions: With a strict definition 
(touching the mark while looking in the mirror), 2 of 4 infants at 24-mo passed, and none at 15-
mo.  With a more generous definition (touching close to the mark with or without concurrent 
looking) then all 24-month-old pass, and 2 of the 5 15-mo infants also pass.  Using naming self 
as the criterion, all 24-mo pass, but none of the 15-mo pass.  Secondly, maternal scaffolding 
appears to enhance MSR performance, as only one of 24-mo human infants ‘passed’ based on 
spontaneous behavior, but all four passed based on prompted behaviors (see Table 8).   
Comparison Between The Two Studies  
Using “Developmental Method” for Chimpanzee infants 
 Using the developmental criteria for chimpanzee infants entails determining whether each 
individual ‘passed’.   Comparative studies require that the mirror guidance and touches co-occur, 
whereas developmental studies typically do not.  In the current studies, we measured mark 
touches in humans and chimpanzees with the same definition: each self-touch or mark-touch was 
required to be concurrently mirror-guided.  We found very similar results in the frequency of 
self- and mark-touches (Figures 4 & 5).  Using the developmental criteria of a single touch, we 
conclude self-recognition in chimpanzee infants 28-mo and older (Table 6) and in human infants 
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at 24-mo (Table 7).    If we loosen the definition to include any mirror-guided self-touches, we 
might conclude MSR in 24-mo chimpanzees and in 3 of 5 15-mo humans (see Table 9).   
 To investigate the effect of using cosmetics for the mark, we noted the time when each 
infant first touched the mark, and whether the first touch was mirror-guided or not (Table 10).  
We reasoned that if the tactile properties of the mark drew the infant’s attention, then first 
touches would occur soon after the application, and without regard to the mirror.  Furthermore, 
we reasoned that if the initial discovery enhanced performance, then each infant who touched the 
mark initially without using the mirror, would subsequently exhibit mirror-guided touches.  
However, the data in Table 10 does not support either hypothesis. Only 1 infant, (Bunny) 
touched the mark within seconds after it was applied.  Bunny’s first touch was mirror-guided. 
One chimpanzee and one human touched the mark within the first 2 min of application, however, 
neither used the mirror even after this first touch.  Of the 10 infants who touched the mark, only 
1 touched first without the mirror and then touched with the use of the mirror (Rebecca), albeit 
22 minutes separated these touches.  Recall that the human infants were informed of the mark at 
the time of application, and did not immediately touch the mark. Therefore, ‘knowing’ that they 
were marked, either by feel or by being told, did not enhance mirror-guided mark touches.   
 There are three major differences in these studies of chimpanzee infants and of human 
infants, all of which disadvantage chimpanzees.  First, none of these chimpanzee infants were 
language-trained, and therefore, none were able to respond with self-labeling (see e.g., (Miles, 
1994; Patterson & Cohn, 1994).  Secondly, none of the chimpanzee infants had spent many 
months engaged in ‘quality time’ with caregivers and mirrors.  Finally, the chimpanzee infants 
did not receive any maternal scaffolding during the actual testing.  The data in Table 8 suggest 
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that MSR performance is enhanced when mothers provide several cues to responding, e.g., by 
asking ‘who’s that, while looking back and forth from baby to mirror image.  
Using “Comparative Method” for Human infants 
The initial comparative method of Gallup was to look for the combination of the changes 
in social and self-directed behaviors. Direct application of this assessment technique is not 
possible, however, as human infants were not initially mirror naive, and neither social nor self-
directed responses were measured.  Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the species comparisons of mirror-
guided to non-mirror-guided touches (a compromise as the mirror was present for all 
participants). Note that these graph illustrate mean frequency, but were almost identical to those 
depicting mean duration.   The frequency of mirror-guided self-touching (Figure 4) in the 24-
month humans was comparable to that found in the older chimpanzee groups (those that passed), 
and the frequencies were comparable for groups that did not pass (15-month human group and 
the 24-month chimpanzee groups).  Figure 5 indicates that the 24-month humans, and the 28-, 
30-, and 32- month chimpanzees all exhibited mirror-guided mark-directed behavior.  However, 
when we use the comparative analytic method, empirically more mark touches that are mirror-
guided than not, to ascertain passing (Gallup, 1970; Povinelli et al., 1993; Swartz & Evans, 1991; 
Swartz et al., 1999),  we would conclude that none of the infants of either species are self 
recognizers.   
It is interesting to compare performance with the more rigorous definitions found in the 
comparative literature.  For example, Povinelli et al., (1993) changed the criteria of self-directed 
behavior to require at least 5 occurrences and over 30s total duration.  By these criteria, only 3 
subjects would be considered as self recognizers; one 24-month-old humans, who exhibited 15 
mirror-guided self-touches lasting a total of 36 secs; and two 30-month-old chimpanzees (with 
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23 and 6 mirror-guided touches, with total duration of 143 and 34 sec respectively).  After this 
initial screen, Povinelli et al (1993) required at least 8 mirror-guided mark-directed touches.  By 
this comparative criterion, not a single infant in the current studies would pass.  In fact, Povinelli 
et al (1993) using these criteria found chimpanzees did not pass until 4.5 - 8 years of age. We do 
not know at what age human infants might show equally ‘compelling’ evidence of self-
recognition. 
General Discussion 
Careful consideration of testing procedures reveals that the developmental mark test is 
different from the comparative mark test.  Clearly, the rationale for using different procedures 
has been that different research questions are asked in developmental and comparative studies of 
mirror self-recognition (see Table 3).   As a result of considering the methods and assumptions 
underlying the two approaches, we designed a developmental comparative mark test to ask the 
same question about the emergence of mirror self-recognition in human infants and in 
chimpanzee infants.  Similar procedures revealed similar results across species.  Here we discuss 
issues arising about the meaning of the mark test and the importance of different testing 
procedures (e.g., the discovery process, of the subjects’ emotional status, and definitions of the 
target behavior).   
Critique Of Importance Of Discovery 
Comparative psychologists advocate testing procedures, such as using dye, anesthesia, 
and isolation, as a means to control the way in which the mark is discovered.   Developmental 
studies share a concern with how the mark is discovered by using covert marking procedures and 
hypoallergenic cosmetics.  We changed marking procedures to investigate whether we could 
enhance mirror self-recognition: the mark was applied explicitly and infants were tested in social 
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groups where peers informed about the mark). Fewer infants touched the mark in this study 
than was expected based on published studies (see Table 4).  These findings support our 
conclusion that the discovery process may be unimportant.  
 One argument about the (lack of) importance of the discovery process is offered at a 
theoretical level.  The objective indication of mirror self-recognition is defined as mirror-guided 
(indicating knowledge of the correspondence between the self and the image in the mirror), 
mark-touching (a specific target on the self).  The ability to use the reflective image in the mirror 
to guide movements to the mark is the passing criterion.  How the mark is discovered is 
tangential, and not a part of the operational definition.  A second argument is empirically based.  
Telling the infant that they were to be marked and applying the mark overtly did not increase the 
incidence of passing the mark test in humans at either 15 mo or at 24 months.  In fact, even when 
another infant repeatedly pointed at the mark while saying “make-up” to a 24-month-old, he did 
not touch the mark.  Knowledge of the application of the mark does not cause mirror self-
recognition.  
 A criticism of the comparative mark-and-mirror procedures asserts that differential 
recovery from anesthesia could account for the findings (Heyes, 1994).  Anesthesia was not used 
in Lin et al., (1992), in this replication, or in any human study, so we question how recovery 
from anesthesia can explain mirror self-recognition (see also Swartz et al., 1999).   
 If discovery is unimportant, as we claim for theoretical and empirical reasons, then the 
marking and testing procedures of future comparative studies of self-recognition can be more 
like those of developmental studies. Research in self-awareness in nonhuman primates can be 
conducted without the need for anesthesia, permanent dye, or isolation at testing.      
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Self-Labeling And Mark-Touching  
 The mark test is valuable as an objective assessment of self-recognition.  Objectivity 
resides in the well-defined target behavior, touching the mark.  Human infants can also pass with 
verbal labels (to the self, the mark, or the marked area), as these were interpreted to be 
equivalently referential. Comparative researchers have raises questions about this equivalency, 
suggesting that self-labeling can be explained as the product of associative learning.   “A child 
held in front of a mirror and told its name over and over might learn to associate the name with 
its reflected image, but this would not mean it had learned to recognize itself” (Gallup, 1982, p. 
239).  The current study found that all self-labeling occurred after maternal prompts, that none 
were spontaneous, lending support to Gallup’s claim.  Johnson (1982) found that at 18months, 
infants were as likely to say their name when viewing the image of another infant as when 
viewing the self.  But here we found that 15mo infants did not self-label, even after maternal 
prompting.  The age at which verbalizations emerge (verbal labeling of self from mirror, from 
videotape, from photographs, and appropriate use of personal pronouns) differs from the age 
when infants touch the mark (Courage et al., 2004).    We concur with Johnson (1982, p. 222), 
“it is difficult to infer that the use of one’s own name or personal pronoun, by itself, directly 
reflects self-recognition (see also Gallup, 1979)”.   In future studies, verbal and nonverbal 
measures must be distinguished. 
Issues Of Emotional Components Of Testing 
 The contrast between developmental and comparative studies of self-recognition is 
dramatic with regard to the consideration given to the emotional state of the participant during 
testing.  In developmental studies, the potential for positive mood is maximized: (a) testing is 
scheduled when infants are in their ‘best’ state (e.g., not irritable); (b) mothers stay with infants 
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throughout testing, and alleviate any distress; and (c) potential stressors are minimized.  These 
measures are successful: there are low exclusions and drop-outs in MSR studies, e.g., 6% (Lewis 
& Brooks-Gunn, 1979) to 14% (Amsterdam, 1972).  In comparative studies, typically there are 
no procedures to maximize positive emotional state (see Lin et al., 1992 as an exception): 
Separation from cagemates (Bard & Nadler, 1983) , anesthesia, and recovery alone in an 
unfamiliar room, cause distress (Povinelli et al., 1993); and all individuals are included.  In the 
illustrative studies, we maintained equivalent levels of comfort for human and chimpanzee 
infants, and found very similar levels of behavior (see Figures 4 & 5).  Comparative studies that 
include distressed individuals probably underestimate MSR abilities.  
What Is The Meaning Of The Mark-And-Mirror Test? 
Although studies use different definitions of mark touching, there appears to be general 
agreement about the meaning of the mark test, i.e. that passing the mark test indicates self-
recognition or self-awareness. In the initial studies, reference to the mark was stated to indicate 
the presence of a self-concept (Amsterdam, 1972; Gallup, 1970).  Currently developmental 
psychologists distinguish many aspects of the self concept (e.g., subjective self, categorical self, 
autobiographical self: see Mitchell, 1994 for review), and place mirror self-recognition as a 
milestone in the development of the objective self (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989).  
Interestingly, Gallup (1970; 1977) linked a sense of self to attributions of minds/beliefs to other, 
and stated that MSR is an index of empathy and theory of mind.   
Commonly, mirror self-recognition is stated to reflect infants’ ability to compare the 
mental representation of their typical face (without the mark) with their marked face reflected in 
the mirror (e.g., Harel et al., 2002).  “Mirror self-recognition requires coordinating a mirror-
image (primary representation) with one’s representation of oneself” (p. 66), therefore mirror 
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self-recognition requires a “cognitive capacity for secondary representation” (Asendorpf, 
2002).  Implicit in this conception of MSR is the importance of discovery: if infants already 
know that they are marked then they already have two representations, one with and one without 
a mark, and the mirror image would correspond to the mental representation of the marked face.  
Additionally, the research by Priel & de Schonen (1986) suggests that forming a mental 
representation of the face through prior mirror experiences may not be required for MSR. Yet 
many studies have linked MSR with representational ability (Chapman, 1987; Cicchetti, 
Rogosch, Toth, & Spagnola, 1997; Lewis, 1991; Mans, Cicchetti, &  Sroufe, 1978). 
 In human infants, MSR emerges concurrent with many new accomplishments in 
cognitive, social, emotional, and linguistic domains.  Although Piaget claimed mental 
representation was the mechanism underlying all change in the 18-24mo period, this does not 
clarify those aspects specifically relevant for self-awareness. In trying to determine the 
mechanism underlying MSR, we can be misled by the myriad of concurrent changes.  Samples 
with atypical development tease apart some of the confounds, e.g., children with Downs 
Syndrome given the mark test, demonstrates that a mental age of 18-20 months is necessary for 
MSR (Mans et al., 1978).  Cross-cultural studies can also be useful:  MSR is exhibited by human 
infants even in the absence of extensive learning history with mirrors (Keller et al., 2004; Priel & 
de Schonen, 1986). Additional types of comparative approaches are necessary to disentangle 
variables, to better understand the cognitive bases of MSR.  
  What do we learn from viewing MSR across primate species?  Chimpanzee and human 
infants have very similar early development (Bard et al., 2005), with notable differences.  Our 
finding that chimpanzees touch the mark, whereas humans touch close to the mark, may be a 
result of chimpanzees’ relatively advanced motor skills.  Additionally, chimpanzees do not speak 
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but pass the test therefore MSR is not based on verbal language (c.f. Lewis, 1994).   
Understanding the reflective quality of the mirror is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
MSR (c.f., Courage et al., 2004), because monkeys understand the reflective quality of the mirror 
in terms of object movement but neither explore the contingency of their own movements, nor 
act on the self while looking in the mirror (Anderson, 1983, 1984; Anderson & Gallup, 1999; 
Gallup, 1970; Gallup, Wallnau, & Suarez, 1980).  Perhaps there is also a differential interest in 
facial features between monkeys and apes (Nielsen, Dissanayake, & Kashima, 2003): mutual 
gaze occurs in chimpanzees and humans (Bard et al., 2005), but most mutual engagement in 
monkeys is primarily in the tactile modality    The link between contingency exploration and 
self-referential behavior is found for chimpanzees (Lin et al., 1992 and current study), and 
dolphins (Marino, Reiss, & Gallup, 1994), and notably monkeys do neither (Anderson & Gallup, 
1999; Inoue Nakamura, 2001; Matsuzawa, 2001; Parker, Mitchell, & Boccia, 1994; Suddendorf 
& Whiten, 2001).   
 Returning to the objective target behavior, what is being assessed by the mark test is the 
ability to touch the face (or the mark on one’s own face) while guiding the action while watching 
in the mirror. Amsterdam (1972) assumed that MSR ability indicated that infants associate the 
face in the mirror with their own face, and Gallup assumed that MSR indicates self-identity: 
“The capacity to correctly infer the identity of the reflection presupposes an identity on the part 
of the organism making that inference” (Gallup, 1982, p. 240).  We suggest that passing the mark 
test isn’t about the mirror, isn’t about discovery of the mark, but is about being self-aware; 
otherwise, MSR would be much more widespread amongst mammalian species.  The mark-and-
mirror-test provides a behavioral index of an ability to hold simultaneously two views of the self: 
one ‘view’ is based in the experience of acting as an independent agent (akin to the subjective 
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self: Lewis, 1994) and the other ‘view’ is the representation of the self, the mirror image.  
Stage 6 in object permanence would suggest that the self is conceived as something permanent in 
time and space.  The MSR test shows, additionally, an understanding that the self can exist and 
can be represented: the mirror image of the self is a representation of the self as an iconic 
symbol.  MSR occurs when the mirror image is known to be a representation, and the self is 
known as an independent agent.  When the self who is acting can become represented in the 
mirror, then mirror-guided touching of the self can occur.  Prior to attaining this iconic symbolic 
capacity, mirror-guided mark-touching is not possible and can not be enhanced, even by fully 
informing about the mark.  We suggest that this holds true in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
contexts.   
 An advantage of conceiving of MSR as the ability to act on the self while guiding the 
actions via the mirror image, is the deductive re-affirmation of the objective target behavior, the 
core of the mark test.  Another advantage is that we do not need to infer a metarepresentational 
process (a representation of a mental representation of the self).  Earlier in development, the self 
is discovered in action and in contingent action with others (Bigelow, 1981; Papoušek & 
Papoušek, 1974; Rochat, 1998), but the mirror image is interpreted as being another (e.g., social 
playmate).  Mirror-guided touching of the self may emerge from more diffuse explorations of 
contingency between actions of the self and of the mirror image (Bigelow, 1981; Custance & 
Bard, 1994; Lin et al., 1992; Papoušek & Papoušek, 1974; Parker et al., 1994; Rochat, 1998). 
Gradually, through repeated experiences of the one-to-one correspondence of self-action and 
action of the mirror image, the ability emerges, in humans and other apes, to represent the self in 
two places at once.  MSR is thus, a secondary representation in accordance with the definition 
offered by Suddendorf and Whiten (2001).   
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The objective study of self-recognition with the use of a mirror and a mark applied to 
the face was designed independently by Gallup (1970) for use with chimpanzees and monkeys, 
and by Amsterdam  (1971) for use with human infant.  The mark tests, as used by comparative 
and developmental psychologists, differ in procedure, assessment criteria, assumptions, and 
rationale.  When the same mark test is used, the emergence of mirror self-recognition in human 
and chimpanzee infants is found to be similar.  Although most studies do not rely on the 
objective target behavior, a touch of the mark on the face while looking at the mirror image, 
most studies interpret passing the mark test to indicate self-awareness.  Fully informing infants 
about the mark did not enhance performance.  Therefore, we suggest that passing of the mark test 
is based on being able to concurrently represent the self in multiple forms; the acting self is 
understood to exist at the same time as the visually reflected acting self in the mirror, an iconic 
symbolic capacity.  
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Table 1: The mark & its application: Amsterdam’s and Gallup’s methods and rationale.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Amsterdam (1972)       Gallup (1970) 
The mark and its application 
Spot of rouge      Alcohol-soluble dye (Rhodamine B-base) 
Applied (covertly?) by mother   Applied while unconscious 
Placed alongside nose     Placed on brow ridge & opposite ear 
In one location     In two non-visible locations 
Rationale & implications 
Semi-naturalistic laboratory    Highly controlled laboratory  
Mimic everyday activity    Controlled discovery of the mark 
 Minimize distress     Dye can’t be felt or smelled 
 High ecological validity    Marked under anesthesia 
Objective behavior      Objective behavior 
 Locate mark on face = MSR    Locate mark on face = MSR  
One spot - generalized response   Two spots- touch specific places 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
•
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Table 2:  Testing procedures and their assumptions 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Amsterdam (1972)     Gallup (1970) 
Testing procedure 
5-min familiarization     12 days of isolation in novel room  
undressed & marked      anesthetized, marked, recovery 
Mother scaffolds infant’s response   No scaffolding 
Mother comforts as necessary   No interventions for distress 
 
Rationale & implications 
Maximize motivation     Maximize motivation 
 by minimizing distress        by minimizing ‘distractions’ 
 maternal interventions     no interaction with people 
Control seeing own clothes    Control for mirror exposure 
Assume equal learning history   Control for learning history  
Observe ‘natural’ behavior    Observe ‘natural’ behavior 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3:  Assessment criteria and interpretations 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Amsterdam (1972)   Gallup (1970) 
Assessment criteria 
Recognition of mirror image Combination of changing behaviors 
 Touch spot of rouge  decrease social responses 
 Turns head and observes nose     increase self-directed responses 
 Labels self (verbal)  Touches to mark 
 Points to self  confirms self-directed touches 
   more when mirror present than absent 
Interpretations 
Reference to mark =  Reference to mark = 
Presence of self-concept   Presence of self-concept 
Individuals pass (or not)  Species possess self awareness  
 
Research Question 
Developmental path to MSR? Do species exhibit MSR? 
Development = change with age Development = emergence over short time 
Age-typical behavior Age is irrelevant 
Prior history assumed equal Prior history controlled (very important) 
Same for all humans Same for all chimpanzees 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4: Operational definitions of self-recognition 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Developmental studies: nonverbal behaviors 
Touch mark  (assumed in all definitions- but not always stated) 
Touch the region of the mark (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993) 
Touch nose (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Harel et al., 2002; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) 
Look at mark/nose (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Schulman & Kaplowitz, 1977)  
Point at mark (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) or self (Amsterdam, 1972) 
Try to touch mark, including touch opposite cheek (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993) 
Wipe nose repeatedly (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) 
Exaggerated facial expressions (Vyt, 2001) 
Turn to reflected object (Priel & de Schonen, 1986) 
Comparative studies: nonverbal behaviors 
Touch mark  (Gallup, 1970; Lin et al., 1992)  
 only if more with mirror than without mirror (Povinelli et al., 1993: Swartz, 1998) 
‘Compelling’ self-directed touches = 5 bouts and 30sec or more (Povinelli et al., 1993) 
  as above but excluding rubs or wipes to the face  (de Veer et al., 2001) 
‘Compelling‘ self-touches and at least 10 mark-directed touches (Povinelli et al., 1993) 
Developmental studies: Verbalizations 
Name or personal pronoun (almost all studies) 
Indicate something was different about marked face (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993; 
Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Courage et al., 2004; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5:  Passing rates for MSR in human infants based on age 
AGE (months) Pass MSR test (%)  Source 
15   19%   (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) 
15-16  24% (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993) 
15-17    0% (Amsterdam, 1972) 
18  25% (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) 
18-19  25%   (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993) 
18-20  42% (Amsterdam, 1972) 
18-20  42% (Johnson, 1982) 
19  55% (Vyt, 2001) 
20  74% (Harel et al., 2002) 
21 mo  63% (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) 
21-22mo 33% (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993) 
21-23mo 50% (Johnson, 1982) 
18-24mo 75% (Brooks-Gunn & Lewis, 1984) 
18-24mo 81% (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978) 
19-24mo 52% (Schulman & Kaplowitz, 1977) 
21-24mo 63% (Amsterdam, 1972) 
24mo  66% (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) 
24-26mo 33% (Johnson, 1982) 
24-25mo 58% (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993) 
27-28mo 67% (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993) 
_____________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6: Age-related differences in individual chimpanzees' ability to self recognize 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
SUBJECT AGE    HIGHEST OBSERVED BEHAVIOR CONCLUSION  
Callie  24m   contingent     no  
Artemus 24m  mirror-guided, self-directed      S-R (?) 
Arthur  28m   contingent     no 
Josh  28m  mirror-guided, self-directed     S-R (?) 
Lizzie  28m  mirror-guided, self-directed    S-R (?) 
Edwina 28m  mirror-guided, self-directed    S-R (?) 
Rebecca 28m  mirror-guided, MARK-directed   S-R 
Rebecca* 30m   contingent     no 
Edwina* 30m   contingent     no 
Arthur* 30m  mirror-guided, self-directed    S-R (?) 
Bunny  30m  mirror-guided, MARK-directed   S-R 
Callie*  30m  mirror-guided, MARK-directed   S-R 
Artemus* 32m  mirror-guided, MARK-directed   S-R 
Elwood 32m  mirror-guided, MARK-directed   S-R 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: * indicates a second test at a later age, S-R = self recognizer as determined by mark 
touching, S-R (?) = self recognizer as determined by self-directed touches.
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Table 7: Individual humans' ability to understand task, apply label and pass MSR test 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
SUBJECT AGE   HIGHEST OBSERVED BEHAVIOR VERBAL LABEL? WIPE DOLL? CONCLUSION  
P – 1   15mo mirror-guided, self-directed no  yes   No 
P – 2   15mo no mirror-guided behavior no  yes   No  
P – 3  15mo ? no mirror-guided behavior  no  no   ? 
P – 4  15mo mirror-guided, self-directed  no  yes   No  
P – 5  15mo mirror-guided, close-to-mark no   yes   No  
P -  6  24mo mirror-guided, MARK-directed  yes  yes   S-R  
P – 7  24mo mirror-guided, self-directed  yes  yes   S-R (?) 
P – 8  24mo mirror-guided, close to mark* yes  yes   S-R (?) 
P – 9        24mo  mirror-guided, MARK-directed   yes  yes   S-R  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 8:  Spontaneous and prompted touches to the mark (MARK) or close to mark (CLOSE) that are mirror-guided (mg) 
or not (no), by human infants 
 Prior to M's prompts After M's prompts 
24mo CLOSE 
mg 
CLOSE 
no 
MARK 
mg 
MARK 
no Self-label 
CLOSE 
mg 
CLOSE 
no 
MARK 
mg 
MARK 
no Self-label 
Rebecca 9 2 1 0 no 1 1 0 2 yes 
P-7 0 1 0 0 no 0 0 0 0 yes 
Lucy 0 1 0 0 no 0 1 0 1 yes 
Murray 0 0 0 0 no 0 0 2 2 yes 
15mo            
Catherine 0 0 0 0 no 0 0 0 0 no 
Daniel 0 0 0 0 no 0 0 0 0 no 
Josh 0 0 0 0 no 0 0 0 0 no 
Megan 0 1 0 0 no 0 0 0 0 no 
P-5 0 0 0 0 no 1 0 0 0 (touches head) 
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Table 9: Number of subjects that engaged in touches to self or to mark (percentage of age group) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Self-directed          Mark-directed  
  Mirror-guided   without mirror Mirror-guided  without Mirror 
Humans 
 15 mo  3 of 5 ( 60%)  4 of 5 ( 80%) 0 of 5 (  0%) 0 of 5 (  0%) 
 24 mo  2 of 4 ( 50%) 3 of 4 ( 75%) 2 of 4 ( 50%) 3 of 4( 75%) 
Chimpanzees 
 24 mo  1 of 2 ( 50%)  2 of 2 (100%) 0 of 2 (  0%) 2 of 2 (100%) 
 28 mo  4 of 5 ( 80%)  5 of 5 (100%) 1 of 5 ( 20%) 4 of 5 ( 80%) 
 30 mo 3 of 5 ( 60%)  5 of 5 (100%) 2 of 5 ( 40%) 4 of 5 ( 80%) 
 32 mo  2 of 2 (100%)  2 of 2 (100%) 2 of 2 (100%) 2 of 2 (100%) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 10 : Elapsed time from mark application until the first touch  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
SUBJECT AGE (mo) MIRROR-GUIDED   WITHOUT THE MIRROR 
    First Second    First  Second 
CHIMPANZEES 
Artemus 24         --    4 min 34sec  
 
Josh  28 --    7 min  3sec 
 
Edwina  28 -- --   8 min 31sec   19 min 39sec 
 
Rebecca 28 24 min  6sec 1 min 23sec     2 min  1sec 
 
Arthur  28 --    5 min 45sec 
 
Elwood 30 -- 11 min 48sec   1 min 51sec   11 min 52sec   
   
 
Bunny  30 12sec 4 min 56sec          16sec   13 min 25sec 
        
 
HUMANS 
P- 6  24 14 min 57 sec   15 min 5 sec 
 
P-8  24 --    1 min 45 sec 
 
P- 9  24 49sec   11 min 51sec 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Two chimpanzees and 6 humans did not touch the mark at all.  
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Table 11: Theories of mirror self-recognition 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
MSR = self concept (Amsterdam, 1972; Gallup, 1970) 
Kinesthetic-visual matching: Inductive theory (Mitchell, 1993b) 
Facial Imitation Theory (Parker et al., 1994) 
Featural recognition (Nielsen et al., 2003) 
Body-objectification theory: Deductive theory (see discussion in Mitchell, 1993b) 
Perspective-taking theory (see discussion in Mitchell, 1993b) 
Mirror-correspondence theory (see discussion in Mitchell, 1993b) 
MSR = Secondary representation (Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001) 
Anesthesia Artifact Theory (Heyes, 1994) 
Associated capacities  (see Parker et al., 1994)  
 Synchronic imitation (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993) 
 Object permanence (Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Chapman, 1987) 
 Empathy (Bischof Kohler, 1994) 
Consciousness Awareness (Gallup, 1977; Lewis, 1991; Zazzo, 1948) 
______________________________________________________________________________
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Social responses to the mirror by young chimpanzees across baseline, test1, test2 
session (mean frequency with standard error for each age group). 
Figure 2: Mirror-guided self-touches by young chimpanzees across 3 test sessions (mean 
frequency with standard error for each age group). 
Figure 3: Touches to the mark that were mirror-guided or not, by young chimpanzees (mean 
frequency with standard error for each age group). 
Figure 4:  Self-directed touches that are mirror-guided (mg) or not, by young humans (left panel) 
and by young chimpanzees (right panel). 
Figure 5: Touches to the mark that are mirror-guided (mg) or not, by young humans (left panel) 
and by young chimpanzees (right panel). 
